Mighty Knowledge (with Simon Goldstein)
The Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books
Analysis, forthcoming [Penultimate]
New Work for Certainty
Philosophers' Imprint, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Certainty in Action
The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Fallibility for Expressivists
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Reasons for Reliabilism
In Brown and Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, Oxford University Press, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Prospects for Evidentialism
In Littlejohn and Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, Routledge, forthcoming [Penultimate]
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem
Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2913, 2020 [Penultimate]
Modal Virtue Epistemology (with Carlotta Pavese)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79, 2020 [Penultimate]
Subjective Disagreement
Noûs 53 (4): 819-851, 2019 [Penultimate]
Relativism and Expressivism
In Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge: 528-540, 2019 [Penultimate]
The Toxin and the Dogmatist
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 727-740, 2019 [Penultimate]
Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations
Philosophers' Imprint 19 (10): 1-27, 2019 [Penultimate]
Might do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD (with Andy Egan)
Semantics and Pragmatics 11: 1-44, 2018
Believing Epistemic Contradictions (with Simon Goldstein)
The Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 87-114, 2018 [Penultimate]
Justification as Faultlessness
Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 901-926, 2017 [Penultimate]
Reliabilist Epistemology (with Alvin Goldman)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015
Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat
The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 145-159, 2015 [Penultimate]
Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding
Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1847-1868, 2015 [Final]
Dissertation
Reduction in Epistemology
Rutgers University, 2016
Miscellany
Proof of the Completeness of Propositional Logic, In Verse
The Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books
Analysis, forthcoming [Penultimate]
New Work for Certainty
Philosophers' Imprint, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Certainty in Action
The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Fallibility for Expressivists
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Reasons for Reliabilism
In Brown and Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, Oxford University Press, forthcoming [Penultimate]
Prospects for Evidentialism
In Littlejohn and Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, Routledge, forthcoming [Penultimate]
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem
Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2913, 2020 [Penultimate]
Modal Virtue Epistemology (with Carlotta Pavese)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79, 2020 [Penultimate]
Subjective Disagreement
Noûs 53 (4): 819-851, 2019 [Penultimate]
Relativism and Expressivism
In Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge: 528-540, 2019 [Penultimate]
The Toxin and the Dogmatist
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 727-740, 2019 [Penultimate]
Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations
Philosophers' Imprint 19 (10): 1-27, 2019 [Penultimate]
Might do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD (with Andy Egan)
Semantics and Pragmatics 11: 1-44, 2018
Believing Epistemic Contradictions (with Simon Goldstein)
The Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 87-114, 2018 [Penultimate]
Justification as Faultlessness
Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 901-926, 2017 [Penultimate]
Reliabilist Epistemology (with Alvin Goldman)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015
Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat
The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 145-159, 2015 [Penultimate]
Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding
Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1847-1868, 2015 [Final]
Dissertation
Reduction in Epistemology
Rutgers University, 2016
Miscellany
Proof of the Completeness of Propositional Logic, In Verse