Below you can find my published research. You can find some recent talks here, and an overview of my research here.
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1. Inclusive Inquiry (with Finnur Dellsén), forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Abstract, Local File]
2. Moral Justification forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics  [Abstract, Local File]
3. Reliabilism and its Rivals, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Elements series), forthcoming 
4. Moorean Promises forthcoming in Ethics [Abstract, Draft]
5. ​​Inquiry Beyond Knowledge forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Abstract, Local File]
6. Unsettled Belief forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly ​[Abstract, Local File]
7. Noncognitivism Without Expressivism Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107(3): 726-788, 2023 [Abstract, Local File]
8. Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action (with Carlotta Pavese & Paul Henne), Ergo 10(36): 1019-1056, 2023 [Local File]
9. Evidence, Justification, and Truth Critical Notice of Comesaña, Being Rational & Being Right, Analysis 83(3): 616-626, 2023 [Local File]
10. Skills as Knowledge (with Carlotta Pavese) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101(3): 609-624, 2023 [Abstract, Local file]
11. A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention (with Simon Goldstein) The Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2): 346-378, 2023 [Abstract, Local File]
12. Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity (with Carlotta Pavese) Mind 131 (523): 919-936, 2022 [Abstract, Local file]
13. Mighty Knowledge (with Simon Goldstein) The Journal of Philosophy 118 (5): 229-269, 2021 [Abstract, Local file]
14. Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books Analysis 81 (2): 193-198, 2021 [Abstract, Local file]
15. Moral and Epistemic Evaluations: A Unified Treatment Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1): 23-49, 2021 [Local file]
16. ​Reasons for Reliabilism in Brown and Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, & Defeat, Oxford University Press, 2021 [Abstract, Local file]
17. New Work for Certainty Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8): 1-25, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
18. Certainty in Action The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281): 711-737, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
19. Fallibility for Expressivists Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 763-777, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
20. A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2913, 2020  [Abstract, Local file]
21. ​Modal Virtue Epistemology (with Carlotta Pavese) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
22. Subjective Disagreement Noûs 53 (4): 819-851, 2019  [Local file]
23. The Toxin and the Dogmatist Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 727-740, 2019  [Abstract, Local file]
24. Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations Philosophers' Imprint 19 (10): 1-27, 2019  [Abstract, Local file]
25. Might do Better:  Flexible Relativism and the QUD (with Andy Egan) Semantics and Pragmatics 11: 1-44, 2018
26. ​Believing Epistemic Contradictions (with Simon Goldstein) The Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 87-114, 2018  [Abstract, Local file]
27. Justification as Faultlessness Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 901-926, 2017​  [Abstract, Local file]
28. Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 145-159, 2015  [Abstract, Local file]
29. Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1847-1868, 2015  [Abstract, Local file]

Survey Articles

1. Prospects for Evidentialism in Littlejohn and Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, forthcoming [Abstract, Local file]
2. Reliabilist Epistemology (with Alvin Goldman) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021
3. ​Relativism and Expressivism, in Kusch (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, 2019  [Abstract, Local file]

Book Reviews
Review of Staffel, Unsettled Thoughts, The Philosophical Review, 131 (3): 394-398 [Local file]
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Dissertation
Reduction in Epistemology, Rutgers University, 2016

Miscellany
Proof of the Completeness of Propositional Logic, in Verse