Below you can find my published papers. You can find drafts of some works in progress here, some recent talks here, and an overview of my research here.
A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention (with Simon Goldstein), forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly
Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity (with Carlotta Pavese), forthcoming in Mind
Skills as Knowledge (with Carlotta Pavese), forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy [Local file]
Mighty Knowledge (with Simon Goldstein), forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy [Abstract, Local file]
Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books, forthcoming in Analysis [Abstract, Local file]
Moral and Epistemic Evaluations: A Unified Treatment, forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives [Local file]
Reasons for Reliabilism, in Brown and Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, Oxford University Press, 2021 [Abstract, Local file]
New Work for Certainty, Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8): 1-25, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Certainty in Action, The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281): 711-737, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Fallibility for Expressivists, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 763-777, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem, Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2913, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Modal Virtue Epistemology (with Carlotta Pavese), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Subjective Disagreement, Noûs 53 (4): 819-851, 2019 [Local file]
The Toxin and the Dogmatist, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 727-740, 2019 [Abstract, Local file]
Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations, Philosophers' Imprint 19 (10): 1-27, 2019 [Abstract, Local file]
Might do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD (with Andy Egan), Semantics and Pragmatics 11: 1-44, 2018
Believing Epistemic Contradictions (with Simon Goldstein), The Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 87-114, 2018 [Abstract, Local file]
Justification as Faultlessness, Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 901-926, 2017 [Abstract, Local file]
Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat, The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 145-159, 2015 [Abstract, Local file]
Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding, Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1847-1868, 2015 [Abstract, Local file]
Survey Articles
Prospects for Evidentialism, in Littlejohn and Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, forthcoming [Abstract, Local file]
Reliabilist Epistemology (with Alvin Goldman), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021
Relativism and Expressivism, in Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge: 528-540, 2019 [Abstract, Local file]
Book Reviews
Review of Staffel's Unsettled Thoughts for The Philosophical Review, forthcoming [Draft]
Dissertation
Reduction in Epistemology, Rutgers University, 2016
A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention (with Simon Goldstein), forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly
Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity (with Carlotta Pavese), forthcoming in Mind
Skills as Knowledge (with Carlotta Pavese), forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy [Local file]
Mighty Knowledge (with Simon Goldstein), forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy [Abstract, Local file]
Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books, forthcoming in Analysis [Abstract, Local file]
Moral and Epistemic Evaluations: A Unified Treatment, forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives [Local file]
Reasons for Reliabilism, in Brown and Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, Oxford University Press, 2021 [Abstract, Local file]
New Work for Certainty, Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8): 1-25, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Certainty in Action, The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281): 711-737, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Fallibility for Expressivists, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 763-777, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem, Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2913, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Modal Virtue Epistemology (with Carlotta Pavese), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79, 2020 [Abstract, Local file]
Subjective Disagreement, Noûs 53 (4): 819-851, 2019 [Local file]
The Toxin and the Dogmatist, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 727-740, 2019 [Abstract, Local file]
Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations, Philosophers' Imprint 19 (10): 1-27, 2019 [Abstract, Local file]
Might do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD (with Andy Egan), Semantics and Pragmatics 11: 1-44, 2018
Believing Epistemic Contradictions (with Simon Goldstein), The Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 87-114, 2018 [Abstract, Local file]
Justification as Faultlessness, Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 901-926, 2017 [Abstract, Local file]
Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat, The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 145-159, 2015 [Abstract, Local file]
Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding, Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1847-1868, 2015 [Abstract, Local file]
Survey Articles
Prospects for Evidentialism, in Littlejohn and Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, forthcoming [Abstract, Local file]
Reliabilist Epistemology (with Alvin Goldman), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021
Relativism and Expressivism, in Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge: 528-540, 2019 [Abstract, Local file]
Book Reviews
Review of Staffel's Unsettled Thoughts for The Philosophical Review, forthcoming [Draft]
Dissertation
Reduction in Epistemology, Rutgers University, 2016