Fallibility for Expressivists
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 763-777, 2020
Abstract. Quasi-realists face the challenge of providing a plausible analysis of acknowledgments of moral fallibility (for example, ‘I believe that lying is wrong, but I might be mistaken’). This paper develops a new analysis of these acknowledgements, according to which they express moral uncertainty. After advertising the advantages of this analysis, I take up the question of how to understand moral uncertainty in expressivist terms.
You can find the published version here, and the penultimate version here.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 763-777, 2020
Abstract. Quasi-realists face the challenge of providing a plausible analysis of acknowledgments of moral fallibility (for example, ‘I believe that lying is wrong, but I might be mistaken’). This paper develops a new analysis of these acknowledgements, according to which they express moral uncertainty. After advertising the advantages of this analysis, I take up the question of how to understand moral uncertainty in expressivist terms.
You can find the published version here, and the penultimate version here.