A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem
Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2913, 2020
Abstract. According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great e ort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the ‘Many Attitudes Problem’: the problem of developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution.
You can find the published version here, and the penultimate version here.
Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2913, 2020
Abstract. According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great e ort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the ‘Many Attitudes Problem’: the problem of developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution.
You can find the published version here, and the penultimate version here.