Research Overview
Most of my research focuses on understanding normative thought and talk, broadly construed. Some specific projects include:
The role of certainty in epistemology
In the medieval and early modern traditions, the notion of certainty occupied center-stage in epistemology. By contrast, contemporary epistemologists tend to give certainty short shrift, focusing their attention on knowledge instead. I think this is a mistake; I argue that many of the jobs philosophers enlist knowledge or justified belief to perform are better played by two related, but importantly distinct notions: epistemic and psychological certainty. I've developed some of these ideas in my papers, 'New Work for Certainty', 'Certainty in Action', and 'Inquiry for Fallibilists'.
The viability of noncognitivism
One attractive model of normative thought comes from the noncognitivist tradition. According to noncognitivists, normative beliefs are desire-like attitudes directed towards non-normative contents. Noncognitivism is appealing because it explains normative thought in naturalistic terms, while also capturing the ‘internalist’ insight that normative thought is intrinsically motivating. Despite these benefits, many philosophers remain convinced that noncognitivism faces insurmountable difficulties. In an ongoing series of papers, I aim to develop a novel form of noncognitivism that overcomes these challenges. I tackle facets of this project in my papers, 'Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations', 'Fallibility for Expressivists', 'A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem', and 'Noncognitivism Without Expressivism.'
A related strand of my research explores our attitudes towards 'subjective' matters, broadly construed to include matters of taste (for example, whether a particular dish is delicious), aesthetic questions, and modal matters (for example, whether the butler probably did it, or whether it might be raining). I take up these issues in 'Subjective Disagreement', `Mighty Knowledge' (co-authored with Simon Goldstein), and 'Might do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD' (co-authored with Andy Egan).
Epistemology beyond belief
Most work in epistemology focuses on beliefs. However, many other mental states can be normatively evaluated: intentions, desires, hopes, and fears can all be appraised as rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Moreover, many of these evaluations have a distinctly epistemic component. One way for my fear of a burglary to be irrational is for it to be based on an epistemically unjustified belief in the probability of being burgled. Along with Zach Barnett and Mattias Skipper, I am currently working on a grant project (funded by the Singaporean Ministry of Education) devoted to developing a systematic theory of (i) which nondoxastic mental states are epistemically evaluable, (ii) the conditions under which these mental states have a particular epistemic status.
Connections between epistemology and action theory
I'm also interested in the connections between epistemology and practical rationality. In 'The Toxin and the Dogmatist', I use some lessons from the toxin puzzle about practical rationality to make progress on the Kripke-Harman dogmatism puzzle in epistemology. In work with Carlotta Pavese, I’ve explored the connections between knowledge, skillfulness, and intentional action. Our paper ‘Modal Virtue Epistemology’, develops a unified account of knowledge and skills, according to which both can be analyzed in terms of success across a sufficiently high proportion of accessible worlds. In more recent work, we've explored a more robust connection between knowledge and practical rationality, arguing that the anti-luck condition on knowledge also applies to intentional and skillful action ('Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity', 'Skills as Knowledge').
Most of my research focuses on understanding normative thought and talk, broadly construed. Some specific projects include:
The role of certainty in epistemology
In the medieval and early modern traditions, the notion of certainty occupied center-stage in epistemology. By contrast, contemporary epistemologists tend to give certainty short shrift, focusing their attention on knowledge instead. I think this is a mistake; I argue that many of the jobs philosophers enlist knowledge or justified belief to perform are better played by two related, but importantly distinct notions: epistemic and psychological certainty. I've developed some of these ideas in my papers, 'New Work for Certainty', 'Certainty in Action', and 'Inquiry for Fallibilists'.
The viability of noncognitivism
One attractive model of normative thought comes from the noncognitivist tradition. According to noncognitivists, normative beliefs are desire-like attitudes directed towards non-normative contents. Noncognitivism is appealing because it explains normative thought in naturalistic terms, while also capturing the ‘internalist’ insight that normative thought is intrinsically motivating. Despite these benefits, many philosophers remain convinced that noncognitivism faces insurmountable difficulties. In an ongoing series of papers, I aim to develop a novel form of noncognitivism that overcomes these challenges. I tackle facets of this project in my papers, 'Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations', 'Fallibility for Expressivists', 'A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem', and 'Noncognitivism Without Expressivism.'
A related strand of my research explores our attitudes towards 'subjective' matters, broadly construed to include matters of taste (for example, whether a particular dish is delicious), aesthetic questions, and modal matters (for example, whether the butler probably did it, or whether it might be raining). I take up these issues in 'Subjective Disagreement', `Mighty Knowledge' (co-authored with Simon Goldstein), and 'Might do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD' (co-authored with Andy Egan).
Epistemology beyond belief
Most work in epistemology focuses on beliefs. However, many other mental states can be normatively evaluated: intentions, desires, hopes, and fears can all be appraised as rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Moreover, many of these evaluations have a distinctly epistemic component. One way for my fear of a burglary to be irrational is for it to be based on an epistemically unjustified belief in the probability of being burgled. Along with Zach Barnett and Mattias Skipper, I am currently working on a grant project (funded by the Singaporean Ministry of Education) devoted to developing a systematic theory of (i) which nondoxastic mental states are epistemically evaluable, (ii) the conditions under which these mental states have a particular epistemic status.
Connections between epistemology and action theory
I'm also interested in the connections between epistemology and practical rationality. In 'The Toxin and the Dogmatist', I use some lessons from the toxin puzzle about practical rationality to make progress on the Kripke-Harman dogmatism puzzle in epistemology. In work with Carlotta Pavese, I’ve explored the connections between knowledge, skillfulness, and intentional action. Our paper ‘Modal Virtue Epistemology’, develops a unified account of knowledge and skills, according to which both can be analyzed in terms of success across a sufficiently high proportion of accessible worlds. In more recent work, we've explored a more robust connection between knowledge and practical rationality, arguing that the anti-luck condition on knowledge also applies to intentional and skillful action ('Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity', 'Skills as Knowledge').