Justification as Faultlessness

Bob Beddor

$2 \cdot 11 \cdot 16$

Outline

Introduction

Introduction

(1) Given the evidence, Poirot is justified in believing the butler did it.

(2) Given the refugee crisis, the UN is justified in intervening.

Introduction

Introduction

(3) Given the evidence, Poirot { should / must / may } believe the butler did it.

(4) Given the refugee crisis, the UN { should / must / may } intervene.

Introduction

- **Deontological Account of Justification:**
  Justification can be analyzed in deontic terms

  (Alston 1988; Kim 1994; Plantinga 1993; Steup 2001; Littlejohn 2012.)

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Introduction

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- **Q:** What's the best version of a deontological account?

Outline

A Taxonomy of Deontic Expressions

Permissives	**Expressions of Obligation**
Permitted, Allowed, May, Can	*Should, Ought to, Must, Have to, Need to*

Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

Weak Necessity Modals	**Strong Necessity Modals**
Should, Ought to	*Must, Have to, Need to*

(Sloman 1970; Horn 1972, 1989; Harman 1993; McNamara 1996; von Fintel and Iatridou 2008; Copley 2006; Portner 2009; Lassiter 2011)

Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

(5) Johnny $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \checkmark \text{ should} \\ \#\text{must} \end{array} \right\}$ do the dishes, but he doesn't have to.

Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

(5) Johnny $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \checkmark \text{ should} \\ \#\text{must} \end{array} \right\}$ do the dishes, but he doesn't have to.

(6) ?? Johnny ought to do the dishes; in fact, he should do the dishes.

(7) ✓ Johnny ought to do the dishes; in fact, he $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{must} \\ \text{has to} \end{array} \right\}$ do the dishes.

Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

Some languages have different lexical items for strong and weak necessity (e.g., English, German)

Some languages express weak necessity by augmenting a strong necessity modal with conditional morphology.

- e.g., French: *Il devrait faire la vaisselle* (weak) vs. *Il doit faire la vaisselle* (strong)
- Other examples: Spanish, Greek, Croatian, Russian, Icelandic

Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

- Deontic modals are quantifiers over a set of accessible worlds



Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

- Deontic modals are quantifiers over a set of accessible worlds ranked by some normative standard N

  (Kratzer 1981, 1991, 2012)



Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

- Should [/Ought to] ϕ.

  $\approx$ All of the optimal worlds (according to N) are ϕ-worlds.



Should ϕ = True

Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

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

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

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

Must ϕ = False

Necessity Modals: Weak vs. Strong

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(8) You must give at least 5% of your income to charity. But you really should give upwards of 10%.

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

Permission

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Permission–Strong Necessity Duality:

Permitted ϕ iff $\neg$(Must $\neg\phi$)

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Permission–Strong Necessity Duality:

Permitted ϕ iff $\neg$(Must $\neg\phi$)

(9) # You must give at least 5% of your income to charity. But you may [/are permitted to] give less than that.

Permission

- Permitted ϕ.

  $\approx$ At least one acceptable world is a ϕ-world.



Permitted ϕ = True

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

Permitted ϕ = True

Faultlessness

Faultlessness

Faultlessness–Weak Necessity Duality:

Faultless ϕ iff $\neg$(Should [/Ought] $\neg\phi$)

Faultlessness

- Faultless ϕ.

  $\approx$ At least one optimal world is a ϕ-world.



Faultless ϕ = True

Faultlessness

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

Faultless ϕ = True

Faultlessness

a : You give 15% of your income to GiveDirectly
b : You give 15% of your income to Against Malaria Foundation
c : You give 7% of your income to GiveDirectly



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

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

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

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

Faultlessness

- Do any natural language expressions convey faultlessness?

Faultlessness

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- "The English modal system has modals without duals, [for example] *ought* and *should*, on both their epistemic and deontic interpretations."

  - Kratzer 2013: 184

The Space of Options



Outline

Justified Under Negation

(10) a. S is not justified in ϕ-ing. $\Rightarrow$

b. S should not ϕ.

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(11) a. $\neg$(S should [/must] ϕ). $\not\Rightarrow$

b. S should [/must] $\neg\phi$.

Justified Under Negation



Should ϕ

Justified Under Negation



$\neg$(Should ϕ)

Justified Under Negation



$\neg(\text{Should } \phi) \not\Rightarrow \text{Should } \neg\phi$.

Justified Under Negation





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

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

(11b) a. ¬(I should [/must] eat Bread Pudding). True

b. I should [/must] not eat Bread Pudding. False

Justified Under Negation: The Permissive View

(10) a. S is not justified in ϕ-ing. $\Rightarrow$

b. S should not ϕ.

Justified Under Negation: The Permissive View

(10) a. S is not justified in ϕ-ing. $\Rightarrow$

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(12) a. $\neg$(S is permitted to ϕ).

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(12) a. $\neg$(S is permitted to ϕ). $\Rightarrow$

b. S must $\neg\phi$. $\Rightarrow$

c. S should $\neg\phi$.

Justified Under Negation: The Permissive View



Permitted ϕ

Justified Under Negation: The Permissive View



$\neg$Permitted ϕ

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

$\neg$Permitted ϕ = Must $\neg\phi$

Justified Under Negation: The Permissive View



$\neg$Permitted ϕ = Must $\neg\phi \Rightarrow$ Should $\neg\phi$

Justified Under Negation: The Faultlessness View

(10) a. S isn't justified in ϕ-ing. $\Rightarrow$

b. S should not ϕ.

(13) a. $\neg(\neg(\text{S should not } \phi)) \Rightarrow$

b. S should not ϕ.

Justified Under Negation: The Faultlessness View



Faultless $\phi = \neg$(Should [/Ought] $\neg\phi$)

Justified Under Negation: The Faultlessness View



$$\neg\text{Faultless } \phi = \neg(\neg(\text{Should [/Ought] } \neg\phi)) = \text{Should [/Ought] } \neg\phi.$$

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

Say that S has *multiple options* iff there are mutually incompatible courses of action each of which S is morally justified in pursuing.

If the Obligatory View is correct, every case of multiple options is a genuine moral dilemma.

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(14) You're morally justified in donating to GiveDirectly and you're morally justified in donating to AMF.

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(14) You're morally justified in donating to GiveDirectly and you're morally justified in donating to AMF. $\not\Rightarrow$

(15) You should donate to GiveDirectly and you should donate to AMF.

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(14) You're morally justified in donating to GiveDirectly and you're morally justified in donating to AMF. $\not\Rightarrow$

(15) You should donate to GiveDirectly and you should donate to AMF.



Multiple Options and Dilemmas

Say that S has *multiple doxastic options* iff there are mutually incompatible doxastic attitudes towards p each of which is (propositionally) justified for S.

If the Obligatory View is correct, every case of multiple doxastic options is a genuine epistemic dilemma.

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(16) S is (propositionally) justified in believing p and S is justified in suspending judgment on p.

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(16) S is (propositionally) justified in believing p and S is justified in suspending judgment on p. $\not\Rightarrow$

(17) S should believe p and S should suspend judgment on p.

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(18) S is justified in ϕ-ing and S is justified in ψ-ing

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(18) S is justified in ϕ-ing and S is justified in ψ-ing

(19) S is permitted to ϕ and S is permitted to ψ. (**Permissive View**)

Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(18) S is justified in ϕ-ing and S is justified in ψ-ing

(19) S is permitted to ϕ and S is permitted to ψ. (**Permissive View**)

(20) $\neg$(S should not ϕ) and $\neg$(S should not ψ). (**Faultlessness View**)

The Lottery Paradox

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(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

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Multi-Premise Closure (MPC): If S is justified in believing p_1-p_n, and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then S is justified in believing q.

The Lottery Paradox

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Multi-Premise Closure (MPC): If S is justified in believing p_1-p_n, and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then S is justified in believing q.

(22) S is justified in believing that all the tickets will lose.

Kroedel's Solution to the Lottery Paradox

(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

(23) For each ticket, S is permitted to believe it will lose.

Kroedel's Solution to the Lottery Paradox

(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

(23) For each ticket, S is permitted to believe it will lose.

a. S is permitted to believe ticket 1 will lose; & S is permitted to believe ticket 2 will lose;... & S is permitted believe ticket *n* will lose. (**Narrow**)

b. S is permitted to [believe ticket 1 will lose; & believe ticket 2 will lose... & believe ticket *n* will lose]. (**Wide**)

(Kroedel 2012)

Kroedel's Solution to the Lottery Paradox

(24) a. Permitted ϕ.

b. Permitted ψ. $\not\Rightarrow$

c. Permitted $(\phi \wedge \psi)$.

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Permissive MPC: If S is permitted to [believe p_1-p_n], and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then S is permitted to believe q.

Kroedel's Solution to the Lottery Paradox

(23) For each ticket, S is permitted to believe it will lose.

a. S is permitted to believe ticket 1 will lose; & S is permitted to believe ticket 2 will lose;... & S is permitted believe ticket n will lose. (**Narrow**)

b. S is permitted to [believe ticket 1 will lose; & believe ticket 2 will lose... & believe ticket n will lose]. (**Wide**)

Permissive MPC: If S is permitted to [believe p_1-p_n], and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then S is permitted to believe q.

(25) S is permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose.

Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox

(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

(26) For each ticket, ¬(S should not believe it will lose).

Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox

(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

(26) For each ticket, ¬(S should not believe it will lose).

a. ¬(S should not believe ticket 1 will lose); &¬(S should not believe ticket 2 will lose);... & ¬(S should not believe ticket *n* will lose). (**Narrow**)

b. ¬(S should not [believe ticket 1 will lose; & believe ticket 2 will lose;... & believe ticket *n* will lose]). (**Wide**)

Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox

(27) a. $\neg$(Should not ϕ).

b. $\neg$(Should not ψ). $\not\Rightarrow$

c. $\neg$(Should not $(\phi \wedge \psi)$).

Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox



Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox

Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox

(26) For each ticket, ¬(S should not believe it will lose).

a. ¬(S should not believe ticket 1 will lose); &¬(S should not believe ticket 2 will lose);... & ¬(S should not believe ticket *n* will lose). (**Narrow**)

b. ¬(S should not [believe ticket 1 will lose; & believe ticket 2 will lose;... & believe ticket *n* will lose]). (**Wide**)

Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox

(26) For each ticket, ¬(S should not believe it will lose).

a. ¬(S should not believe ticket 1 will lose); &¬(S should not believe ticket 2 will lose);... & ¬(S should not believe ticket n will lose). (**Narrow**)

b. ¬(S should not [believe ticket 1 will lose; & believe ticket 2 will lose;... & believe ticket n will lose]). (**Wide**)

Faultless MPC: If ¬(S should not [believe p_1-p_n]), and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then ¬(S should not believe q).

Faultlessness and the Lottery Paradox

(26) For each ticket, ¬(S should not believe it will lose).

a. ¬(S should not believe ticket 1 will lose); &¬(S should not believe ticket 2 will lose);... & ¬(S should not believe ticket n will lose). (**Narrow**)

b. ¬(S should not [believe ticket 1 will lose; & believe ticket 2 will lose;... & believe ticket n will lose]). (**Wide**)

Faultless MPC: If ¬(S should not [believe p_1-p_n]), and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then ¬(S should not believe q).

(28) ¬(S should not believe all the tickets will lose).

The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox

(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

(29) For each ticket, S should believe that it will lose.

The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox

(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

(29) For each ticket, S should believe that it will lose.

a. S should believe ticket 1 will lose, & S should believe ticket 2 will lose,... & S should believe ticket *n* will lose. (**Narrow**)

b. S should [believe ticket 1 will lose, & believe ticket 2 will lose,... & believe ticket *n* will lose]. (**Wide**)

The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox

The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox

(30) a. Should ϕ.

b. Should ψ. $\Rightarrow$

c. Should $(\phi \wedge \psi)$.

The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox



The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox

The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox

(29) For each ticket, S should believe that it will lose.

a. S should believe ticket 1 will lose, & S should believe ticket 2 will lose,... & S should believe ticket *n* will lose. (**Narrow**)

b. S should [believe ticket 1 will lose, & believe ticket 2 will lose,... & believe ticket *n* will lose]. (**Wide**)

The Obligatory View and the Lottery Paradox

(29) For each ticket, S should believe that it will lose.

a. S should believe ticket 1 will lose, & S should believe ticket 2 will lose,... & S should believe ticket n will lose. (**Narrow**)

b. S should [believe ticket 1 will lose, & believe ticket 2 will lose,... & believe ticket n will lose]. (**Wide**)

Obligatory MPC: If S should [believe p_1-p_n], and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then S should believe q.

(31) S should believe all the tickets will lose.

Outline

Acceptable but Suboptimal

Recall that:

1. Weak necessity modals don't entail strong necessity modals,
2. Permissives are the duals of strong necessity modals.

Acceptable but Suboptimal

Recall that:

1. Weak necessity modals don't entail strong necessity modals,
2. Permissives are the duals of strong necessity modals.

So it should be coherent to affirm that ϕ should not be the case even though ϕ is permitted.

Acceptable but Suboptimal

(32) ✓ You should give upwards of 10%. But you're permitted to give less, as long as you give at least 5%.

Acceptable but Suboptimal

Commenting Quandary

Amanda is a professor who has a two-year-old daughter. At 11pm, Amanda receives an email from her undergraduate student Joe, with a third draft of a paper that's due tomorrow at noon. She has already commented on the first two drafts. Joe is struggling in the class, but she can tell he is on the verge of some kind of breakthrough... It would take half an hour to read the draft and write the comments, and Amanda is tired. Her daughter will wake up early. (Harman forthcoming)

(33) ✓ Amanda should give Joe comments, but it would be permissible not to.

An Example Involving Epistemic Modals

(34) ✓ Joe should be home by now, but he might [/may] be stuck in traffic.

A Puzzling Conjunction

(35) ?? S is justified in ϕ-ing, but S should not ϕ.

A Puzzling Conjunction

(35) ?? S is justified in ϕ-ing, but S should not ϕ.

(36) ?? Kwame is justified in believing it will rain, but Kwame shouldn't believe it will rain.

Explaining the Puzzling Conjunction

(35) ?? S is justified in ϕ-ing, but S should not ϕ.

Explaining the Puzzling Conjunction

(35) ?? S is justified in ϕ-ing, but S should not ϕ.

(37) $\neg$(S should not ϕ), but (S should not ϕ)

An Objection

Restaurant Conflagration

Kendra has just checked the restaurant's hours online and consequently believes the restaurant is open. Claire is aware of this fact, but also knows that the restaurant burned to the ground moments ago.

(38) (*Uttered by Claire:*) Kendra is justified in believing the restaurant is open, but Kendra shouldn't believe the restaurant is open (since it isn't).

Response

Truth Norm: You should only believe p if p is true.

Evidence Norm: You should believe p if p is well-supported by your evidence.

Response

Truth Norm: You should only believe p if p is true.

Evidence Norm: You should believe p if p is well-supported by your evidence.

(39) # Kendra is justified in believing the restaurant is open. But in view of her evidence, Kendra shouldn't believe the restaurant is open, since it isn't.

Outline

Conclusion


Expressions of Permission
May, Permitted, Allowed
Strong Necessity Modals
Must, Have to, Need to
Expressions of Faultlessness
???
Weak Necessity Modals
Should, Ought to

Conclusion


Expressions of Permission
May, Permitted, Allowed
Strong Necessity Modals
Must, Have to, Need to
Expressions of Faultlessness
Justified
Weak Necessity Modals
Should, Ought to

Conclusion

Conclusion

Thanks!

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Free Choice Effects

Free Choice Effects

(40) a. You're justified in ϕ-ing or ψ-ing. $\rightsquigarrow$

b. You're justified in ϕ-ing.

c. You're justified in ψ-ing.

Free Choice Effects

Free Choice Effects

(41)
a. You should ϕ or ψ. $\not\rightsquigarrow$
b. You should ϕ.
c. You should ψ.

Kroedel's Solution to the Lottery Paradox

NB: The formulation of the Permissive MPC matters.

- Correct: If S is permitted to [believe p_1-p_n], and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then S is permitted to believe q.

- Incorrect: If [S is permitted to believe p_1... & S is permitted to believe p_n], and p_1-p_n obviously entail q, then S is permitted to believe q.

Justification Ascriptions: Corpus Data

- *Justified* occurs 5,613 times in the Corpus of Contemporary American English.
- For comparison, *heroic* occurs only 4,230 times, and *appalling* occurs only 1,659 times.
- Majority of occurrences are moral/practical, but at least some are epistemic:
  - 'It follows that a professional school counselor is not justified in believing that the student is incapable of taking proactive action..." — *Empowerment Theory for the Professional School Counselor*
  - "Republicans are taking over the House of Representatives with a justified belief that the American people have given them a mandate..." —*The Democrats and Health Care*.