JUSTIFICATION AS FAULTLESSNESS

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2 · 11 · 16

1   A Taxonomy of Deontic Expressions

Permissives: *Permitted, Allowed, May, Can*

Weak Necessity Modals: *Should, Ought to*

Strong Necessity Modals: *Must, Have to, Need to.*

Evidence that *should* is weaker than *must*:

(5) Johnny $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} ^{\checkmark}\text{should} \\ \#\,\text{must} \end{array} \right\}$ do the dishes, but he doesn't have to.

Optimality Interpretation:
"Should [/Ought] ϕ" $\approx$ ϕ obtains in all of the optimal worlds
"Must ϕ" $\approx$ ϕ obtains in all of the acceptable worlds
    (Cf. von Fintel and Iatridou 2008)

Permissive-Strong Necessity Duality:
Permitted ϕ iff $\neg(\text{Must } \neg\phi)$

(9) # You must give at least 5% of your income to charity. But you're permitted to give less than that.

Faultlessness-Strong Necessity Duality:
Faultless ϕ iff $\neg(\text{Should [/Ought] } \neg\phi)$

**Question:** Do any natural language terms express faultlessness?

Figure 1: Expressions on the left are duals of expressions on the right.

2   Options for a Deontological View

S is justified in ϕ-ing. $=$

a. S must ϕ.		**Stong Necessity**
b. S should ϕ.		**Weak Necessity**
c. S is permitted to ϕ.		**Permissive**
d. $\neg$(S should not ϕ).		**Faultlessness**

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3 Justification ≠ Obligation

3.1 *Justified* Under Negation

(10) is valid, unlike (11):

(10) a. S is not justified in ϕ-ing. $\Rightarrow$
      b. S should not ϕ.

(11) a. $\neg$(S should [/must] ϕ). $\nRightarrow$
      b. S should [/must] not ϕ.

NB: Both the Permissive and Faultlessness Views validate (10):

(12) a. S is not permitted to ϕ. $\Rightarrow$
      b. S should not ϕ.

(13) a. $\neg(\neg$(S should not ϕ)). $\Leftrightarrow$
      b. S should not ϕ.

3.2 Multiple Options and Dilemmas

(14) You're justified in donating to GiveDirectly & you're justified in donating to AMF. $\nRightarrow$

(15) You should donate to GiveDirectly & you should donate to AMF.

(16) S is (propositionally) justified in believing p, & she's also justified in suspending judgment. $\nRightarrow$

(17) S should believe p, & she should suspend judgment.

3.3 The Lottery Paradox

(21) For each ticket, S is justified in believing it will lose.

MPC: If S is justified in believing p_1-p_n, and p_1-p_n obviously entail p_z, then S is justified in believing p_z.

(22) S is justified in believing that all the tickets will lose.

Kroedel (2012)'s solution: (21) is analyzed as (23), which contains a scope ambiguity.

(23) For each ticket, S is permitted to believe it will lose.

Narrow S is permitted to believe ticket 1 will lose; & S is permitted to believe ticket 2 will lose;... & S is permitted believe ticket n will lose.

Wide S is permitted to [believe ticket 1 will lose; & believe ticket 2 will lose... & believe ticket n will lose].

Narrow $\nRightarrow$ **Wide** because permissions don't agglomerate:

(24) a. Permitted ϕ.
      b. Permitted ψ. $\nRightarrow$
      c. Permitted $(\phi \land \psi)$.

This solution works equally well on the Faultlessness View, because faultlessness doesn't agglomerate either:

(27) a. $\neg$(Should not ϕ).
      b. $\neg$(Should not ψ). $\nRightarrow$
      c. $\neg$(Should not $(\phi \land \psi)$).

However, this solution doesn't work on the Obligatory View, since necessity modals agglomerate.

4 Justification ≠ Permission

Since (i) *should* doesn't entail *must*, (ii) *permitted* is the dual of *must*, it should be coherent to affirm that ϕ is permitted, even though ϕ shouldn't be the case.

Examples that bear this out:

(32) ✓ You should give upwards of 10%. But you're permitted to give less, as long as you give at least 5%.

Context: At 11pm, Amanda (a professor) receives an email from a struggling student, with a third draft of a paper that's due tomorrow at noon. Amanda has already commented on the first two drafts. It would take half an hour to read the third draft and write the comments. Amanda is tired and her daughter will wake up early. (Harman forthcoming)

(33) ✓ Amanda should give Joe comments, but it would be permissible not to.

By contrast, the following seems much less coherent:

(35) ?? S is justified in believing p, but S (epistemically) should not believe p.

The Faultlessness View explains this: (35) =

(37) $\neg$(S should not ϕ) & S shouldn't ϕ.

References

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Thomas Kroedel. The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility. *Analysis*, 72(1):57–60, 2012.

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